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Abstract: I analyze the impact of intellectual property and product market com-
petition regulations on innovation and long-run growth in an endogenous growth
model with two R&D performing sectors. I show that strengthening intellectual
property rights and competition in a sector increases its R&D investments. How-
ever, these policies adversely affect R&D investments in the other sector because
of increased factor competition between the sectors. As a result, the overall impact
of such policies on economic growth is ambiguous. I perform a numerical exercise
in an attempt to resolve this ambiguity. This exercise suggests that strengthening
intellectual property rights increases economic growth, but higher competition has
a very limited effect on growth.
Keywords: Intellectual Property Regulation; Product Market Regulation; Two
R&D Sectors; Endogenous Growth
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1 Introduction
The analysis of the effects of intellectual property and product market competi-
tion regulations on innovation is deeply rooted in industrial organization literature
(e.g., Nordhaus, 1969, Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990, Chang, 1995, Matutes, Regibeau,
and Rockett, 1996, Vives, 2008). Traditionally, studies in industrial organization
have considered the effects of such regulations in partial equilibrium frameworks.
A large number of recent studies extend this analysis and examine the effects of in-
tellectual property and product market competition regulations on innovation and
growth in general equilibrium frameworks featuring one R&D performing sector
(e.g., Smulders and van de Klundert, 1995, Yang and Maskus, 2001, O’Donoghue
and Zweimüller, 2004, Chu and Pan, 2013).
These studies have provided answers to a number of important questions, such
as “What are the optimal intellectual property regulation and product market
structure?”. Yet, the frameworks used in these studies are not well suited for the
analysis of the effects of sector specific intellectual property and product market
competition regulations. These frameworks are also not well suited for showing
how such regulations in a sector can affect innovation and growth in other sectors.
Taking sectoral heterogeneity into consideration can be important because, for
example, the regulation of intellectual property has historically been different across
the goods and services sectors. Patents on software and business methods are
relatively recent phenomena and have proved of great relevance, above all, to the
services sector (Tamura, Sheehan, Martinez, and Kergroach, 2005).1 The cross-
sector effects can also shed further light on the likely effects of country-level changes
in intellectual property and product market competition regulations.
In this paper, I derive a stylized endogenous growth model with two R&D
performing sectors and analyze the impact of intellectual property and product
market competition regulations on innovation and growth in the long-run. Each
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firm in the model has its own product line and can engage in in-house R&D, which
then drives long-run growth. In a firm, innovation enhances firm-specific knowledge
on the process of production (alternatively, it enhances knowledge for the quality of
the firm’s product). This knowledge is patented. The firms compete strategically in
the output market and finance their R&D expenditures from operating profits. The
in-house R&D process builds on the knowledge that the firms possess. In a firm,
the R&D process can be improved by combining the firm’s own knowledge with the
knowledge of other firms from its sector. Intellectual property rights determine the
bargaining power of licensors and licensees in the market for knowledge/patents.
More specifically, they determine the amount of knowledge that firms can obtain
without (appropriate) compensation and the amount of knowledge that firms can
license for R&D. Product market regulations determine competitive pressures and
strategic interactions among firms in the product market. I assume that intellectual
property and product market regulations can be sector specific, as well as economy-
wide.
In such a setup, I show that policies, which strengthen intellectual property
rights and increase product market competition in a sector, increase its R&D in-
vestments and growth. These results mirror the results from a similar one-sector
model (see, Jerbashian, 2016). R&D investments increase because stronger in-
tellectual property rights increase the appropriated returns on R&D and higher
competition increases sales and, as a consequence, the marginal product of innova-
tion grows. However, these policies adversely affect R&D investments in the other
sector. R&D investments in the other sector decline because of increased factor
competition between the sectors.
A notable implication of this result is that uniform and economy-wide changes
in intellectual property rights and competition have ambiguous effects on long-run
growth. Similarly, the impact of strengthening intellectual property rights and in-
creasing product market competition in a sector on economic growth is ambiguous.
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In this model, long-run growth necessarily increases with stronger intellectual
property rights and competition in a sector if two conditions are met. The sector has
the highest weight in final output and the positive effect of these regulations on its
R&D investments and growth outweigh their negative effect on R&D investments
and growth in the other sector. For example, dividing the economy into the goods
and services sectors, which is common in aggregate-level studies, would not help
resolve this ambiguity because these positive and negative effects are not readily
identifiable. I make a step toward better informed long-run policy implications
from the model and perform a simple calibration exercise for the goods and services
sectors in Germany, the UK, and the US. The results from this exercise suggest that
economic growth in these countries increases with stronger intellectual property
rights in the goods and services sectors. Such results hold when property rights
are strengthened in one of the two sectors and in both sectors. They hold because
stronger property rights in a sector have a large positive effect on its growth and
relatively small negative effect on the other sector. However, economic growth
almost does not change with a higher level of competition in these sectors because
the positive effects of higher competition in a sector are almost fully offset by the
negative effects in the other sector. This result holds when competition is intensified
in one of the two sectors and in both sectors.
This paper is closely related to Goh and Olivier (2002) and Chu (2011). Goh
and Olivier (2002) analyze the effects of changing the strength of intellectual prop-
erty rights in a growth model with two vertically related sectors and Romer (1990)
style R&D and firm entry. Chu (2011) analyzes such effects in a growth model
with two (horizontally related) sectors and Aghion and Howitt (1992) style R&D
and firm entry/exit. The policy instrument governing intellectual property rights
in both papers is patent breadth, which is defined by the power of patentees in
the product market. The analysis of this paper is complementary to the analyses
and results of Goh and Olivier (2002) and Chu (2011) in a number of ways. In
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contrast to the models of these papers, R&D in a firm improves the production
process (or the quality) of its good and is performed in-house by the firm in the
model of the current paper. This modeling choice is motivated by an observation
that incumbent firms are responsible for sizeable portions of innovation, patent-
ing and cross-licensing activities. For example, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson
(2008) document that productivity growth in incumbent firms accounts for from
a quarter to almost a half of productivity growth at the industry-level (see also
Bartelsman and Doms, 2000, and references therein). Furthermore, in the model
of this paper, the regulation of intellectual property is distinct from the regulation
of product market. The regulation of intellectual property affects the bargaining
power of firms in the market for patents/knowledge. The regulations of interac-
tions among high-tech firms such as Apple, Google, and Intel in product and patent
markets can provide seemingly appropriate examples motivating such a separation.
For instance, the regulations of dominant firms imposed by the Federal Trade Com-
mission primarily affect their interactions in product markets (e.g., search engines,
online-market platforms, hardware). Meanwhile, the regulations governing patent
litigations and essential patents imposed by the US Patent and Trademark Office
affect their interactions in patent markets.2 In this respect, the motivation for
the joint analysis of these regulations is that they are commonly thought to have
a direct impact on innovation and growth (see, e.g., Claessens and Laeven, 2003,
Griffith, Harrison, and Simpson, 2010). Finally, this paper also performs a simple
quantitative analysis for the goods and services sectors.
Methodologically, this paper is related to studies that incorporate in-house R&D
in growth models (e.g., Smulders and van de Klundert, 1995, van de Klundert and
Smulders, 1997, Peretto, 1996, 1998a,b, Peretto and Connolly, 2007). It is also
related to studies that consider pricing, selling, and licensing patents in growth
models (e.g., O’Donoghue and Zweimüller, 2004, Chantrel, Grimaud, and Tourne-
maine, 2012, Akcigit, Celik, and Greenwood, 2016, Jerbashian, 2016). These stud-
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ies have analyzed, for example, how strategic interactions in product markets and
imperfect verification and exclusion, bargaining power and, in general, efficiency
in the patent markets affect innovation and economic growth. The current paper
contributes to these studies by extending the analysis and results to a two-sector
framework, which features cross-licensing of patents. It shows that the results from
one-sector models might not be readily generalized if there is factor competition
between the sectors.
Having a focus on long-run growth, the analysis of this paper omits potential
welfare effects of intellectual property and product market competition regulations.
Judd (1985), Futagami and Iwaisako (2007), Chu (2009) and Jerbashian (2016),
among others, analyze the welfare effects of intellectual property regulations. In
turn, Forni, Gerali, and Pisani (2010), Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Raffo (2014), and
Papageorgiou and Vourvachaki (2017) offer a detailed account of the welfare im-
plications of product market regulations in large, comprehensive frameworks. The
frameworks of these latter studies, however, do not feature sector specific endoge-
nous changes in technology. My quantitative results suggest that this is not a
significant omission at least from the perspective of long-run growth because prod-
uct market regulations are unlikely to affect it.3
The results of this paper also have implications for the empirical analysis of
the effects of intellectual property regulations and the intensity of competition on
innovation and growth in a sector (e.g., Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen, 1999,
Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt, 2005). The results highlight a
necessity of taking into account intellectual property regulation and the intensity
of competition in the remainder of the economy (or closely related sectors) in such
studies.
The next section introduces the model. Section 3 presents the results from the
model and a simple calibration exercise. Section 4 concludes. The proofs of the




The economy is populated by a continuum of identical and infinitely lived house-
holds of mass one. The representative household is endowed with a fixed amount
of labor L, which it supplies inelastically. The household has a logarithmic utility
function and discounts the future streams of utility with rate ρ > 0. The utility
gains are from the consumption of amount C of consumption goods. The lifetime




lnCt exp (−ρt) dt. (1)
The household maximizes its lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint,
Ȧ = rA+ wL− C, (2)
where A is the household’s asset holdings [A (0) > 0], r and w are the market
returns on its asset holdings and labor supply, and the price of C is normalized to
1.




= r − ρ. (3)
This equation, together with the budget constraint (2), describes the paths of the
household’s consumption and assets.
Consumption goods are a Cobb-Douglas basket of X1 and X2 intermediate
goods, where X1 is a CES aggregate of all products produced in sector 1, x1,
and X2 is a CES aggregate of all products produced in sector 2, x2. Sector k =
1, 2 produces Nk number of differentiated products. The elasticity of substitution
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between products in sector k is εk > 1. Formally, consumption goods are given by















and σ1 + σ2 = 1, σk > 0, εk > 1, and k = 1, 2.
The household optimally combines {x1,j}N1j=1 and {x2,j}
N2
j=1 in C. In order to do
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This expression characterizes the household’s demand for {xk,j}Nkj=1.
Intermediate Goods Sectors
In both sectors, firms produce distinct products and have Ricardian production
technologies. For ease of exposition, it is convenient to describe the model for a





where λk,j measures its productivity (or the quality of its product), γk ∈ (0, 1], and
Lxk,j is its labor input. The level of the productivity λk,j indicates the knowledge
of the firm j about its production process. This knowledge is patented.
In both sectors, firms can engage in in-house R&D, which allows them to im-
prove their productivity. They hire labor/researchers Lr in order to perform R&D.
In a firm, the researchers use the knowledge of the firm and combine it with the
knowledge of other firms in its sector to generate new knowledge. Within a sector,
firms can license knowledge/patents from each other. There are also knowledge
spillovers among firms, and firms obtain some knowledge without compensation.












k,j Lrk,j , (9)
where ξk > 0 is an exogenous productivity level, λ̄k represents the spillovers of
knowledge among firms in sector k, uk,j,i is the share of knowledge that the firm
j licenses/purchases from firm i and uk,j,j ≡ 1. The exponent of the firm’s own
knowledge 1 − αk,1 − αk,2 is a fixed technological parameter. It determines the
structure of the firm’s R&D production technology in terms of knowledge inputs.
I use α̃k to denote
α̃k = αk,1 + αk,2 (10)
and assume that αk,1 > 0, αk,2 > 0 and α̃k < 1 to have that spillovers, licensing,
and the knowledge of the firm are productive in R&D.
The firm j maximizes the present discounted value of its profit streams. Rev-
enues of the firm j are gathered from the supply of its good and license fees on its
knowledge/patents. Its costs are labor compensation for production and R&D and
license fees it pays for using the knowledge/patents of other firms. Under Cournot
competition, the firm chooses quantities taking the demand for its good as given,
11
whereas under Bertrand competition it chooses prices. The optimal problem of
firm j is given by
Vk,j = max
Cournot: Lxk,j ,Lrk,j ,{uk,j,i,uk,i,j}
Nk
i=1;(i 6=j)
















(7) , (8) , (9) ,
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and pλk,j and pλk,i are the license fees for uk,i,j and uk,j,i shares of λk,j and λk,i
patent portfolios.
From the optimal problem, it follows that the demands for labor for production














where ek,j is the elasticity of substitution perceived by the firm j and qλk,j is the
shadow value of knowledge accumulation.
The perceived elasticity of substitution depends on the type of competition. It
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can be shown that under Cournot competition it is given by
ek,j = εk
1 +














and under Bertrand competition it is given by
ek,j = εk −







From the optimal problem it also follows that the supply of knowledge, the
demand for knowledge, and the returns on knowledge accumulation are given by
























































Firms license the entire portfolio of their patents/knowledge according to equa-
tion (17). They do so because there are no costs associated with licensing and
there are no strategic considerations in the market for knowledge.4 In turn, firms
are willing to pay a positive fee for licensing knowledge according to equation (18)
because that helps them to improve their R&D process. They are also able to
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obtain some knowledge for free, which is represented by λ̄k. I assume that, in equi-
librium, these spillovers among firms from sector k are proportional to the average







so that, in a symmetric equilibrium, they are the same as the knowledge of any
particular firm from sector k.
Stronger intellectual property rights reduce the ability of firms to obtain knowl-
edge without appropriate compensation. In this setup, strengthening intellectual
property rights corresponds to weakening spillovers and increasing αk,2. Increas-
ing αk,2 increases the compensation of licensors and firms’ returns on knowledge
accumulation and reduces free-riding according to equations (18), (19), and (20).
It also reduces αk,1 since α̃k is fixed. For example, the parameters αk,1 and αk,2
can be thought to represent the bargaining powers of licensees and licensors in a
Nash-bargaining game. The property rights system then governs the bargaining
power of the participants in the market for knowledge by establishing, for example,
the procedures and settlements in patent litigations (see, for further discussion of
this R&D process, Jerbashian, 2016).5 In the reminder of the text, I use αk,1 as
the policy instrument for property rights. This parameter represents the inverse
of the strength of intellectual property rights since increasing it increases spillovers
and reduces αk,2. I use αk,1 because its value can be directly calibrated for the
quantitative exercise.6
The markup over marginal costs 1/ek,j measures the market power that the firm
j has and the perceived elasticity of substitution ek,j measures the competition it
faces. Clearly, the level of competition increases with the actual elasticity of substi-
tution εk and the number of firms Nk. It is also higher under Bertrand competition
than under Cournot competition. I assume that product market regulation is able
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to affect the perceived elasticity of substitution ek,j by changing either εk or Nk or
the type of competition. I consider ek,j as an exogenous policy parameter hereafter.
Several modeling choices merit an in-depth discussion. The R&D process (9)
does not permit an exchange of knowledge between sectors. I maintain this assump-
tion for two reasons. Abstracting from the exchange of knowledge between sectors
allows me to focus on the effect of regulations on innovation and growth through
competition for factor inputs. Moreover, patent licensing and citations are usually
quite rare across broad sectors compared to patent licensing and citations within
sectors (Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Kerr, 2016). I also assume that homogeneous la-
bor is employed in production and R&D in both sectors and that the reallocation
of labor from one sector to another does not entail a transfer of knowledge. In
this sense, the current framework focuses solely on the accumulation of patentable,
disembodied ideas and abstracts from the workers’ knowledge and skills. The mobil-
ity of labor across sectors is an important assumption. Kambourov and Manovskii
(2009) show that skills are occupation specific and are almost independent of sec-
tors. For example, an occupation and a group of workers, which are a reasonable
match to this framework, are the physical, mathematical and engineering science
professionals (e.g., IT-engineers). These workers are employed almost everywhere
(Jerbashian, Slobodyan, and Vourvachaki, 2016).7 Finally, these assumptions are
not uncommon. They are maintained, for example, by Klenow (1996), Goh and
Olivier (2002), and Chu (2011).
The R&D process (9) also has the attractive property of allowing the model
to have a well-defined balanced growth path, though it leads to scale effects, sim-
ilarly to R&D processes and models of Goh and Olivier (2002) and Chu (2011).
These effects are contentious (Jones, 1999, Jones and Romer, 2010), and, in the
quantitative exercise, I follow Chu (2011) and eliminate them setting L = 1.8, 9
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3 Features of the Equilibrium
I focus on a symmetric equilibrium within the intermediate goods sectors. The
results correspond to long-run growth, and the analysis is carried out for a balanced
growth path.
In a symmetric equilibrium, from equations (7) and (13) it follows that
N2Lx2 = DN1Lx1 , (22)










The relation between N2Lx2 and N1Lx1 in equation (22) is a generalization of
the well known constant shares relation between factor demands in Cobb-Douglas
production functions. It coincides with the latter when markups in sectors are
zero. According to equation (22), N2Lx2 increases (decreases) with a higher level of
competition in sector 2 (sector 1). This is because, a higher level of competition in
sector 2 (sector 1) reduces prices and increases the demand for the goods produced
in sector 2 (sector 1).




(NkLxk +NkLrk) , (24)
gives a relation between production inputs in sector 1 and R&D inputs in both
sectors:









The returns on knowledge accumulation in sector k can be derived from equa-
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tions (9), (13), (14), (18), (17), (19), (20), and (21). They are given by
q̇λk
qλk








Combining this relation with equations (3), (5), (8), (13), and (14) gives








Labor allocations in sectors can be derived from equations (9), (22), (25), and (27).

























































































The growth rates in sectors are proportional to the resources invested in R&D
and can be derived from equations (8), (9), (30), and (31). In turn, the growth rate
of consumption goods (final output) is given by
gC = σ1γ1gλ1 + (1− σ1) γ2gλ2 , (32)
where g denotes growth rates. This is a straightforward relation and states that
the growth rate of the economy is a weighted average of sectoral growth rates.10
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The exponent of the firms’ own knowledge in the R&D process, 1 − α̃k, does
not explicitly appear in equilibrium conditions (28)-(31) because the R&D process
is homogeneous of degree 1 in knowledge. This is also the reason why αk,2 does
not appear in these conditions since the value of αk,2 is uniquely determined for
the given values of αk,1 and technological parameter α̃k. Nevertheless, the value
of α̃k restricts the sets of possible values of αk,1 and αk,2 from above given that
α̃k = αk,1 + αk,2 and αk,1, αk,2 > 0.
Corollary 1.
• The growth rate of sector k increases with the level of competition and with
the strength of property rights in sector k: ∂gλk/∂ek > 0 and ∂gλk/∂αk,1 < 0.
• The growth rate of sector k declines with the level of competition and with the
strength of property rights in sector k−: ∂gλk/∂ek− < 0 and ∂gλk/∂αk−,1 > 0.
• Resources devoted to the production of goods in sectors 1 and 2 decline with
the strength of property rights in sectors 1 and 2: ∂Lxk/∂αk,1 > 0 and
∂Lxk/∂αk−,1 > 0.
The first part of the results in this corollary mimics the results from a similar
one-sector model. The rate of growth in sector k increases with the level of compe-
tition in sector k because higher competition implies higher output and sales (i.e.,
∂Lxk/∂ek > 0), which increases the marginal product of innovation.
11 In turn, the
rate of growth in sector k increases with the strength of property rights in sector
k because stronger property rights increase the bargaining power of licensors, who
carry the innovation, and imply higher returns on innovation.
The second part of the results in this corollary holds because of competition for
factor inputs between sectors. A higher level of product market competition in a
sector reduces its prices relative to the prices of the rival sector. This increases the
demand for labor for production and R&D in that sector and wage rates. Higher
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wage rates reduce the output of the rival sector according to equation (22), its
revenues and the marginal product of innovation. Therefore, they reduce innovation
and growth in the rival sector. In turn, stronger property rights in a sector increase
its demand for labor for R&D. It then competes more fiercely for R&D inputs in
the labor market, which increases wage rates and reduces R&D investments and
growth in the rival sector. Higher wage rates are also the reason for the third part
of the results in this corollary, since they drain resources devoted to production in
both sectors.
These results have implications for regulations targeting long-run growth in the
economy. They imply that the effect of an economy-wide, uniform increase in the
level of competition and in the strength of property rights on sectoral growth rates
and the growth rate of the economy (32) is ambiguous. It depends on the model
parameters. They also imply that the growth rate of the economy necessarily
increases with the level of competition and the strength of property rights in a
sector under two intuitive conditions. The sector has the highest weight in final
output, and the positive effect of these regulations on its growth is stronger than
the negative effect of these regulations on the growth in the other sector.12
These results suggest that it is ultimately an empirical question as to whether
uniform changes in intellectual property and competition regulations can increase
long-run growth. Similarly, it is an empirical question as to which of the sectors
such regulations could target. I make an attempt to provide an answer to these
questions and to calibrate the values of the model parameters in the next section.
Quantitative Exercise
I obtain data for the calibration exercise from the EU KLEMS database (O’Mahony
and Timmer, 2009). The data have yearly frequency and are for Germany, the UK,
and the US. Table 1 offers sample period for each country.
I divide these economies into goods and services sectors and, to maintain nota-
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tion, I call the goods sector “sector 1” and the services sector “sector 2.” I compute
the value added share of the goods sector out of total value added. This share has
declined over time everywhere. I set σ1 to be equal to this share in the sample
countries in 2007, which is the last year of the sample period. I also set L = 1 and
ρ = 0.02.
To calibrate the value of D, I compute price-cost margins in each sector. The
price-cost margin in a sector is defined as the ratio of the difference between output
and labor and intermediate costs, on the one hand, and output, on the other [i.e.,
(Output - Labor and Intermediate Input Costs)/Output]. I take the average of the
price-cost margins over the sample years in each sector and country, assign these
values to 1/ek, and compute D using these values and the value of σ1.
I use equation (27) to calibrate the values of αk,1. This equation can be rewritten












where the first term in the square brackets is the ratio of value added and R&D
investments in sector k, adjusted to market power, and gk is labor productivity
growth in sector k. I adopt a broad view of R&D investments and use general
investments instead. The reason for this choice is explained in detail below. I
compute the ratios of value added and investments in the goods and services sectors
in the sample countries and take the averages of these ratios over the sample years.
These averages, together with the calibrated values of markups, are used for the
first term in the brackets. For gk, I use the average values of labor productivity
growth in the goods and services sectors in the sample countries.13
The values of ξ1 and ξ2 can be obtained from equations (30) and (31) for given
values of αk,1 and γk. Similarly to the equation (33) for αk,1, I rewrite these equa-
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According to equations (8) and (9), ξk and γk jointly identify the effect of a
marginal increase of investments on labor productivity growth. In fact, the effects
of ξk and γk are not distinguishable in that context. In what follows, I assume that
γ1 = γ2 ≡ γ, which implies that labor productivity growth differences across sectors,
for a given level of investment, are due to differences in research productivity ξk.
There are four data moments and equations, and I need to identify five parame-
ters, γ, αk,1, and ξk for k = 1, 2. According to equation (33), αk,1 increases with γ.
I allow γ to freely vary in an interval where αk,1 (γ) ∈ (0, 1) and obtain the values
of αk,1 and ξk.
This calibration strategy is not without trade-offs and limitations. First, I use
general investments instead of R&D investments. There are several reasons for this.
The model features expenditures on and income from patent licensing. Currently,
there are no comprehensive data for these and data for R&D expenditures can
be contaminated by expenditures on licensing. Moreover, this parsimonious model
features only R&D investments when broad measures of growth, such as the growth
rate of labor productivity, can be more directly linked to general investments than
to R&D investments. General investments also tend to be more readily available.
Admittedly, however, the use of general investments may obscure the interpretation
of αk,1. Second, I use equilibrium conditions to pin down the values of the model
parameters, which might be problematic as this relatively small model may not
provide a very accurate description of the real economy. Fortunately, at least
equation (33) does not use the entire general equilibrium structure of the model.
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The model then serves the useful purpose of providing a structural interpretation
for αk,1. All in all, the calibration exercise presented in this section is a first step
toward parameterizing the model for a more informed policy discussion.
Table 1 summarizes the values of the model parameters for the sample countries
and the goods and services sectors. It also offers labor productivity growth rates in
the goods and services sectors, gk, and the value of gC , which is a weighted average
of labor productivity growth rates in these sectors and is given by equation (32).
[Table 1 somewhere here]
Notwithstanding the limitations, this calibration exercise delivers appealing pa-
rameter values and results. A seemingly reassuring result derived from the values
of these parameters is that spillovers in the goods sector are lower in the US than
in Germany and the UK. This could be expected as the protection of intellectual
property in the goods sector is usually considered stronger in the US than in Eu-
ropean countries. As compared to the goods sector, spillovers in services in the US
are more comparable to spillovers in services in Germany and the UK and, in all
countries, they are lower than spillovers in the goods sector. The evident similarity
among Germany, the UK and the US could be because of rather comparable levels
of patent protection enforcement for business methods and software innovations,
which is relatively common in the services sector and is a recent phenomenon.
However, the differences between the levels of spillovers in the goods and services
sectors might not be solely attributable to the differences in the protection of in-
tellectual property. For example, differences in the levels of tacit knowledge in the
goods and services sectors can also contribute to the differences between the levels
of spillovers. In the model, the level of tacit knowledge is lower in the goods sector
than in the services sector when the exponent of the firms’ own knowledge in the
R&D process, 1− α̃k, in the goods sector is lower than the exponent in the services
sector. This imposes a stricter restriction on the values of αk,1 from above in the
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services sector than in the goods sector.
The values of the markups also seem to fall in a reasonable ballpark. They are
very close to the values used, for example, by Forni et al. (2010) and imply that
services are less competitive than the goods sector.
A crude way to gain more confidence about this calibration exercise and these
numbers is as follows. I compute the ratio of real investments in a sector and the
sum of real value added in the goods and services sectors. I take the average of this
ratio over time and assume that it roughly corresponds to the amount of investments
adjusted to the scale of the economy (i.e., NkLrk when L = 1). Next, I compute
the ratio of labor productivity growth and the value of this ratio. According to
equation (9), this is given by
gk/NkLrk = γξk. (36)
Finally, I compare the values obtained from this exercise with the multiplication of
calibrated values of γ and ξk. Table 2 offers the results. The differences between the
values of γξk obtained in this exercise and by calibration turn out to be surprisingly
small.
[Table 2 somewhere here]
I conduct several counterfactual exercises. First, I examine the effect of a 10
percent reduction in αk,1 in the goods and services sectors on sectoral growth rates,
as well as on the growth rate of final output. As a policy, this corresponds to
increasing the strength of property rights in these sectors. Panels A.1, A.2, and
A.3 of Table 3 summarize the results in terms of the percentage changes in the
growth rates. Strengthening property rights in a sector increases innovation and
growth in that sector and reduces innovation and growth in the other sector. The
negative effects are quite limited and growth in total output increases with stronger
property rights in both sectors. The elasticities of the growth rate and of innovation
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with respect to the strength of property rights is higher in the goods sector than
in services. This result seems intuitive and suggests that the strength of property
rights is more important in the goods sector than in services. However, the elasticity
of the growth rate of final output with respect to the strength of property rights in
the goods sector is virtually the same as the elasticity with respect to the strength of
property rights in the services sector. This is because services have a greater weight
in the final output. The highest increase in the growth rate of total output can be
obtained by increasing the strength of property rights in both sectors. According
to Panel A.3 of Table 3, a 10 percent reduction in α1,1 and α2,1 increases the growth
rate of total output by about 8 percent in the sample countries.
[Table 3 somewhere here]
I also examine the effects of a 10 percent reduction of markups 1/ek in the
goods and services sectors, which corresponds to a product market regulation that
increases competition in these sectors. Panels B.1, B.2, and B.3 of Table 3 summa-
rize the results. Similarly to stronger property rights, a higher level of competition
in a sector increases innovation and growth in that sector and reduces innovation
and growth in the other sector. However, the effect of a higher level of competition
in a sector is weaker than the effect of stronger property rights. Moreover, the
positive and negative effects are almost comparable and the growth rate of total
output is largely unaffected by stronger competition in either of the sectors. The
latter increases slightly with higher competition in the goods sector and falls with
higher competition in the services sector.
The results for the regulations of product market competition can be important
for at least three reasons. These regulations have non-trivial effects on innovation
and growth in similar one-sector models (e.g., Smulders and van de Klundert, 1995,
Peretto, 1996, Jerbashian, 2016). Meanwhile, the quantitative results reported here
imply that cross-sector effects, stemming from competition for factor inputs, can
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considerably weaken the role played by these regulations for innovation and long-run
growth.14 Clearly, a higher level of competition can affect economic performance
and welfare by improving the allocative/static efficiency. For example, Forni et al.
(2010) and Eggertsson et al. (2014) show that, indeed, a higher level of competition
in the services sector increases welfare in European countries. These papers do not
incorporate sector-level R&D in their models, and my results suggest that this is not
a significant omission at least from the perspective of long-run growth. Moreover,
these results point to the importance of controlling for competition in the rest of the
economy (or in closely related industries) in studies of the impact of competition
on innovation and growth in an industry/sector (e.g., Blundell et al., 1999, Aghion
et al., 2005).15
In Panel C of Table 3, I examine the effect of a 10 percent increase in the
strength of property rights and product market competition in both sectors. The
results from this exercise are similar to those obtained for a 10 percent increase in
the strength of property rights. This holds because increasing the level of product
market competition has a rather limited effect on sectoral growth rates.16
The effect of increasing product market competition in a sector on the growth
rate of the sector is more limited than the effect of strengthening the property rights
because increasing competition entails two opposing effects on R&D and growth.
Increasing the level of competition in a sector increases the resources devoted to
production in that sector, Lx. As a consequence, it increases the marginal product
of innovation and the resources devoted to R&D, Lr. On the other hand, however,
increasing the level of competition reduces Lr because it reduces the amount of
resources that can be devoted to R&D. These positive and negative effects on
Lr are of a second order since they follow from the changes in Lx. Moreover,
the positive effect is only marginally stronger than the negative effect under the
current parametrization of the model. Meanwhile, stronger property rights have a
first order effect on R&D and growth. They increase the returns on R&D and Lr.
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In the data, the strength of the property rights and the level of competition
in the product market can be correlated because, for example, stronger property
rights in a sector can restrict the production of close substitutes in that sector.
Such a correlation naturally arises in models that consider patent breadth as the
instrument of property rights (see, e.g., Goh and Olivier, 2002, Chu, 2011). Regu-
lations increasing patent breadth in these models increase the strength of property
rights, but they reduce product market competition. A comparison of the values
of markups and α1,1 in the US with these values in Germany and the UK can pro-
vide evidence of such a pattern. According to the values of α1,1, property rights
in the goods sector are stronger in the US than in Germany and the UK, where
they are of the same order of magnitude. Meanwhile, the level of competition in
the goods sector is lower in the US than in Germany and the UK according to the
values of 1/e1.
17 However, the exact relation between the level of competition and
the strength of the property rights is a priori ambiguous, and this model is silent
about such a relation given its level of abstraction. One way to incorporate such a
relation is to assume US values of markups and αk,1 for Germany and the UK. The
growth rate of final output in Germany and the UK increases when these countries
have the same level of property rights and competition in the goods and services
sectors as in the US according to Panels D.1 and D.2 of Table 3. Moreover, these
results are almost entirely driven by the differences in the strength of property
rights and are largely unaffected by the level of competition.18
4 Conclusions
In this paper, I analyze the effect of intellectual property and product market
competition regulations on innovation and growth in the long-run in an endogenous
growth model that features two R&D performing sectors. I show that stronger
intellectual property rights and more intensive product market competition in a
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sector increase its innovation and growth. However, they reduce innovation and
growth in the rival sector.
These results imply that the effect of economy-wide changes in intellectual prop-
erty and product market competition regulations on long-run growth can be am-
biguous. Similarly, the effect of changes in intellectual property and competition
regulations in a sector on economic growth can be ambiguous.
I attempt to resolve this ambiguity and provide better informed policy impli-
cations from the model. To do so, I perform a calibration exercise for the goods
and services sectors in Germany, the UK, and the US. The results from this exer-
cise suggest that stronger property rights in the goods and services sectors imply
higher economic growth in these countries. Such results hold when property rights
are strengthened in one of the sectors, as well as in both sectors. They hold be-
cause stronger property rights in a sector have a large positive effect on its growth
and a very marginal negative effect on the growth rate of the other sector. How-
ever, economic growth almost does not change with a higher level of competition
in these sectors because the positive effects of higher competition in a sector are
almost fully offset by the negative effects in the other sector. This result holds
when competition is intensified in one of the sectors and in both sectors.
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1The division of an economy into goods and services sectors has not been very popular in studies
of innovation and growth because services have usually been thought to have low levels of R&D
and patenting. According to Tamura et al. (2005), this perception is far from accurate at least
in the OECD countries where R&D and patenting have increased sharply in the services sector
since the 90s.
2Recent examples include the e-book antitrust case, where Apply was forced to pay $450 million
in damages, and the AdWord patent infringement case, where Google was forced to pay about
$30 million and running royalties of 3.5%.
3The agenda of the European Commission includes increasing competition in member states and,
in particular, in the services sector. My quantitative results suggest that the effects of such policies
on long-run growth are likely to be quite limited.
4These assumptions can seem to be strong. They correspond to assuming an undistorted market
for knowledge and will not hold if, for example, there are policies/taxes that generate licensing
costs. I maintain these assumptions because they help me to focus on the effects of spillovers.
5For example, the property rights system affected a recent patent dispute between Apple and
Google, where the former sought nearly $2 billion in royalties. Apple and Google decided to
settle and engage in cross-licensing in 2014 after Apple was awarded $119.6 million in damages
against Samsung, about 10% of the amount Apple requested. Imperfections in the verification
and exclusion of the use of patents can affect the bargaining power and account for the decision
to settle (Chantrel et al., 2012).
6This property rights instrument is complementary to patent breadth, which establishes the min-
imal difference between an idea and current patents that permits the idea to be patented and
produced. In the framework of this paper, the lines of products, patents, and ideas are fixed and
all ideas are assumed to be patentable. One way to introduce patent breadth in this framework
follows Akcigit et al. (2016) and allows the firms to innovate along multiple lines of ideas.
7Evidence for competition for R&D inputs across sectors is scarce, anecdotal, and usually indirect.
A recent, notorious example is the collusion of software giants, Apple and Google, and chip maker,
Intel, not to poach engineers from each other. This collusion ended with a class-action antitrust
suit.
8Jerbashian (2016) offers an alternative method for eliminating the scale effects in a similar model,
while keeping the inference for knowledge licensing intact. I prefer the current specification
because of its analytical versatility.
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9The R&D process (9) is linear in labor input. Therefore, in the social planner’s problem, Lr = 0
in the sector which makes the lowest contribution to growth, and this sector does not innovate. I
do not present the social planner’s problem for the sake of brevity.
10The effects of the type of competition, εk and Nk (k = 1, 2) on equilibrium outcomes are implicitly
captured in D (23). For example, it can be shown that D is lower (higher) under Bertrand
competition than under Cournot competition in sector 1 (sector 2).
11It can be shown that increasing competition reduces profits (12) and there is a level of competition
when profits are equal to zero. Innovation increases with competition till this level and ceases
when the level of competition increases from this level. This is consistent with Schumpeter’s
argument that firms need to be sufficiently large to innovate and generates an inverted U-shape
like relation between competition and innovation as in the paper by Aghion et al. (2005).
12van de Klundert and Smulders (1999) offer a model with two imperfectly competitive sectors,
where one of the sectors engages in R&D. In such a framework, a higher level of competition
in the sector that performs (does not perform) R&D increases (reduces) the growth rate of the
economy.
13I would need to obtain information on the entire structure of knowledge input in the R&D tech-
nology (9) in order to calibrate the values of α̃k and αk,2 separately since α̃k does not directly
affect the returns on R&D. For this reason, the calibration of the precise value of α̃k can be a
demanding task, and I prefer using αk,1 as the property rights instrument since its value is directly
observable from equation (33).
14Such an inference can be weaker when there are significant mobility costs across sectors and the
production function of intermediate goods (8) exhibits a large level of concavity in labor input.
15In the Online Appendix - Further Results, I use the data of Aghion et al. (2005) and offer evidence
that innovation in a sector can be negatively affected by competition in closely related sectors.
This evidence outlines an area of potentially fruitful future research.
16Table A in the Online Appendix - Further Results presents the effects of reducing the strength of
property rights and product market competition. In absolute terms, these effects are comparable
to the effects of increasing the strength of property rights and product market competition.
17Such a pattern also holds for services, albeit to a lesser extent. The value of α2,1 is the lowest
and the value of 1/e2 is the highest in Germany. Nevertheless, the values of αk,1 and 1/ek in the
UK do not strictly adhere to this pattern.
18I perform similar calibration exercises for the models of Goh and Olivier (2002) and Chu (2011).
I vary parameters corresponding to patent breadth and discuss the results in detail in the Online
Appendix - Further Results.
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Tables




Sample Period σ1 1/e1 1/e2 D g1 g2 gC
Germany 1991–2007 0.311 0.090 0.230 1.873 0.029 0.018 0.021
UK 1970–2007 0.242 0.120 0.140 3.063 0.034 0.015 0.020
US 1977–2007 0.233 0.137 0.223 2.970 0.025 0.012 0.015
γ 0.020 0.040 0.070 0.100 0.130 0.160 0.180
Germany α1,1 0.111 0.221 0.387 0.553 0.719 0.885 0.996
α2,1 0.036 0.072 0.127 0.181 0.236 0.290 0.326
ξ1 33.008 16.504 9.431 6.602 5.078 4.126 3.668
ξ2 5.091 2.545 1.455 1.018 0.783 0.636 0.566
UK α1,1 0.113 0.227 0.397 0.567 0.737 0.907 > 1
α2,1 0.050 0.099 0.174 0.248 0.322 0.397 -
ξ1 53.169 26.584 15.191 10.634 8.180 6.646 -
ξ2 4.707 2.354 1.345 0.941 0.724 0.588 -
US α1,1 0.089 0.179 0.313 0.447 0.582 0.716 0.805
α2,1 0.042 0.084 0.147 0.209 0.272 0.335 0.377
ξ1 32.183 16.091 9.195 6.437 4.951 4.023 3.576
ξ2 3.664 1.832 1.047 0.733 0.564 0.458 0.407
Note: This table offers the sample period for each country and the calibrated values of the model parameters. It
also presents the values of labor productivity growth rates in the sectors, gk, and the value of gC , which is given
by gC = σ1g1 + (1− σ1) g2. The values of parameters are not reported for the UK when γ = 0.180 because the
value of α1,1 for the UK is greater than 1. The goods sector is sector 1 and the services sector is sector 2. The
goods sector is comprised of A, B, C, D, E, and F 1-digit ISIC industries, and the services sector is comprised of
the remainder 1-digit ISIC industries.
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Table 2: Calibrated Values of γξ1 and γξ2 and their Values Implied by Equation (36)
γξ1 γξ2
Calibrated Implied by (36) Calibrated Implied by (36)
Germany 0.660 0.585 0.102 0.091
UK 1.063 0.634 0.094 0.100
US 0.644 0.530 0.073 0.075
Note: This table offers the values of γξ1 and γξ2 computed from the calibration exercise and the values of these
parameters implied by equation (36) and computed as the ratio of labor productivity growth and the ratio of real
investments in a sector and the sum of real value added in the goods and services sectors. The values of γξ1 and
γξ2 computed from the calibration exercise are invariant to the choice of the value of γ. The goods sector is sector
1 and the services sector is sector 2.
Table 3: The Growth Effects of Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights and Increasing
Product Market Competition
A.1: -10%∆ in α1,1 A.2: -10%∆ in α2,1 A.3: -10%∆ in α1,1 and α2,1
%∆ in g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC
Germany 10.568 -0.706 4.089 -1.891 8.075 3.836 8.491 7.326 7.821
UK 10.715 -0.496 4.177 -1.760 8.393 4.161 8.776 7.865 8.245
US 10.622 -0.683 3.771 -1.763 8.076 4.200 8.684 7.352 7.877
B.1: -10%∆ in 1/e1 B.2: -10%∆ in 1/e2 B.3: -10%∆ in 1/e1 and 1/e2
%∆ in g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC
Germany 0.785 -0.461 0.069 -2.336 1.371 -0.206 -1.561 0.916 -0.137
UK 1.174 -0.447 0.229 -1.399 0.532 -0.273 -0.236 0.090 -0.046
US 1.460 -0.631 0.193 -2.592 1.120 -0.343 -1.155 0.499 -0.153
C: -10%∆ in α1,1, α2,1, D.2: US values for α1,1, D.1: US values for
1/e1, and 1/e2 α2,1, 1/e1, and 1/e2 α1,1 and α2,1
%∆ in g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC
Germany 6.782 8.307 7.659 19.348 -9.114 2.992 25.337 -11.791 4.001
UK 8.518 7.962 8.193 30.870 9.242 18.257 22.045 12.341 16.386
US 7.420 7.889 7.705
Note: This table offers the effects of strengthening intellectual property rights (10% reduction in αk,1) and in-
creasing product market competition (10% reduction in 1/ek) on labor productivity growth rates in the goods
and services sectors (g1 and g2) and on the growth rate of the economy [gC = σ1g1 + (1− σ1) g2]. It also offers
the growth effects of using US values of αk,1 and 1/ek for Germany and the UK. The effects are computed as
percentage changes from the values of growth rates offered in Table 1. The goods sector is sector 1 and the services
sector is sector 2.
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Market Competition Regulations in a Model with Two R&D
Performing Sectors”
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and {uk,i,j, uk,j,i}Nkj,i=1(j 6=i) subject to the de-
mand for its product under Bertrand competition.
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Proof of Proposition 1
I use equations (7) and (13) to obtain a relation between labor force allocations in
sectors 1 and 2 in a symmetric equilibrium in these sectors:
N2Lx2 = DN1Lx1 , (3)
where D is given by equation (23). This relation, together with the labor market
clearing condition (24) implies that labor force allocations to production in sectors
2
1 and 2 are given by


















All variables grow at constant rates on a balanced growth path. From equations
(9), (4), and (5), it follows that labor allocations are constant on that path.
I use equations (9), (13), (14), (18), (17), (20), and (21) to rewrite relation (19)
in the following way:
q̇λk
qλk









From the Euler equation (3) and equations (13), (14), and (7), it follows that
another relation for the returns on knowledge accumulation is
q̇λk
qλk
= r − ρ− λ̇k
λk
. (7)
I combine these two relations to obtain









This expression, together with equations (9), (4) and (5), determines labor force



























































































I assume that parameter values are such that N1Lr1 and N2Lr2 are positive so that
both sectors innovate in equilibrium.
In order to obtain relation (33), I use equation (8) and the fact that labor
productivity growth in sector k is given by
gk = γkgλk , (13)
where g denotes growth rate.
Proof of Corollary 1
The growth rate of λk can be derived from equation (9):
gλk = ξkNkLrk , (14)
where N1Lr1 and N2Lr2 are given by equations (11) and (12).








































































































































}2 (α1,1γ1 + 1
)
> 0. (18)
According to equation (23), D declines with e1 and increases with e2. Therefore,
output, R&D, and growth in sector k increase with the level of competition in
sector k and decline with the level of competition in the other sector. A uniform
increase in competition in both sectors can either increase or reduce D depending







e2 (e1 − 1)
e1 (e1 − 1)− e2 (e2 − 1)
e2 (e1 − 1)
. (19)
The partial derivative of the growth rate of consumption goods (final output)















































The sign of this expression depends on the values of the model parameters. This
means that the effect of changing the level of competition in sector k and/or uni-
formly changing the level of competition in both sectors on long-run growth de-
pends on the model parameters. For example, ∂gC/∂D is negative (positive) when
σ1 > 1/2 (σ1 < 1/2) and the effect of changing the level of competition on growth
in sector 2 is higher (lower) than this effect in sector 1. It is necessarily negative
(positive) if σ1 = 1/2, γ1 = γ2, α2,1 = α1,1, and ξ1 > ξ2 (ξ1 < ξ2).
1
5
In a special case when e1 = e2, D does not depend on the levels of competition
in sectors 1 and 2. This implies that the level of competition does not matter for
resource allocations in the economy and imperfect/oligopolistic competition does
not distort them. Such a result holds because all price levels are equally affected
by imperfect competition when e1 = e2 and the relative prices are not. Decentral-
ized equilibrium allocations are socially optimal in a similar one-sector model when
relative prices are not distorted and α.,1 = 0 (e.g., when σ = 1 in the model of
Jerbashian, 2016).2 In contrast, in this two sector model allocations in decentral-
ized equilibrium are not socially optimal. Both sectors innovate in decentralized
equilibrium because of private incentives. However, the social planner would choose
Lr = 0 and no innovation in the sector which has the lowest contribution to growth.
It would do so because R&D process (9) is linear in labor input.
The partial derivatives of labor force allocations with respect to αk,1 can be
readily derived from equations (9)-(12 ). The partial derivatives with respect to










































































































































}2 > 0. (24)
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(1 +D) + 1
]
< 0.
These results imply that reducing αk,1 increases R&D and growth in sector k
and reduces R&D and growth in the other sector.
The effect of a uniform change in α1,1 and α2,1 on the growth rate in sector k is
given by the sum of the partial derivatives of NkLrk with respect to α1,1 and α2,1.
The sign and the magnitude of this effect depend on the model parameters.
The partial derivatives of the growth rate of consumption goods (final output)
with respect to α1,1 and α2,1 can be derived from equations (4), (5), (8), and (21)-























































































The signs of these expressions depend on the values of the model parameters. This
means that the effects of changing α1,1 and α2,1 on long-run growth depend on the
model parameters. For example, ∂gC/∂α1,1 is negative (positive) when σ1 > 1/2
(σ1 < 1/2) and the effect of changing α1,1 on growth in sector 1 is higher (lower)
than this effect on growth in sector 2. Both these expressions are negative when
σ1 = 1/2, ξ1 = ξ2, and γ1 = γ2.
The effect of a uniform change in α1,1 and α2,1 on gC is given by the sum of the
partial derivatives of gC with respect to α1,1 and α2,1. The sign and the magnitude
of this effect depend on the model parameters.
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B Online Appendix - Further Results
Table A: The Growth Effects of Weakening Intellectual Property Rights and Reducing
Product Market Competition
A.1: 10%∆ in α1,1 A.2: 10%∆ in α2,1 A.3: 10%∆ in α1,1 and α2,1
%∆ in g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC
Germany -8.724 0.583 -3.375 1.628 -6.952 -3.303 -7.229 -6.401 -6.753
UK -8.824 0.408 -3.440 1.507 -7.187 -3.563 -7.444 -6.802 -7.070
US -8.761 0.563 -3.110 1.518 -6.953 -3.616 -7.368 -6.421 -6.794
B.1: 10%∆ in 1/e1 B.2: 10%∆ in 1/e2 B.3: 10%∆ in 1/e1 and 1/e2
%∆ in g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC
Germany -1.223 0.024 -0.506 2.437 -1.431 0.214 1.638 -0.962 0.144
UK -1.494 0.130 -0.547 1.435 -0.546 0.280 0.244 -0.093 0.047
US -1.856 0.241 -0.585 2.711 -1.171 0.358 1.217 -0.526 0.161
C: 10%∆ in α1,1, α2,1,
1/e1, and 1/e2
%∆ in g1 g2 gC
Germany -5.721 -7.303 -6.630
UK -7.220 -6.888 -7.027
US -6.247 -6.912 -6.650
Note: This table offers the effects of weakening intellectual property rights (10% increase in αk,1) and reducing
product market competition (10% increase in 1/ek) on labor productivity growth rates in the goods and services
sectors (g1 and g2) and on the growth rate of the economy [gC = σ1g1 + (1− σ1) g2]. The effects are computed
as percentage changes in the values of the growth rates presented in Table 1. The goods sector is sector 1 and the
services sector is sector 2.
B.1 An Extension of Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith,
and Howitt (2005)
In this section, I use the data and an extension of the empirical methodology devel-
oped by Aghion et al. (2005) and present evidence that innovation in an industry
can be affected by competition in closely related industries.
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Aghion et al. (2005) aim to identify the effect of competition in industries on
innovation and growth. They use data from the UK for seventeen 2-digit SIC man-
ufacturing industries for the period 1973–1994. They use the number of citation-
weighted patents in each industry as an indicator of innovation/R&D. In turn, they







where Njt is the number of firms in industry j at time t, i indexes firms, and li is
the price-cost margin/Learner index. Aghion et al. (2005) compute it as
liit =
operating profits - financial costs
sales
. (32)
They run a regression of the following form:









where pjt is the citation-weighted number of patents, β1, β2 and Γ are parameters
and x′jt are control variables. To alleviate reverse causality concerns, Aghion et al.
(2005) use the control function approach. They find that β1 > 0 and β2 < 0 and
that the relationship between competition and innovation has an inverted-U shape.
In column 1 of Table B, I present their preferred results from column 4 of Table 1
of their paper.3
In the main text, I show that competition for factor inputs across two industries
can create a link between competition in one industry and innovation in the other.
I utilize the 2-digit SIC symmetric input-output table and develop a measure of
proximity between industries in terms of factor inputs to formally test this in a
setting with multiple industries. From the input-output table, I obtain the share
of compensation for each input out of the total input compensation in the 2-digit
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SIC industries in the UK in 1984.4 For each industry, I compute the Euclidean
distances between the vector of its input compensation shares and the vectors of
input compensation shares of the remainder of industries. The distances of these
vectors are a measure of dissimilarity between industries, and I take their inverse
to obtain a measure of proximity between industries. Let θjm be the values of this
proximity measure between industries j and m. I replace θjj = 0 and compute for






The data used by Aghion et al. (2005) are unbalanced and many (non-overlapping)
years are missing for SIC industries 23, 35, 37 and 49. I drop these industries from
the sample because keeping them severely restricts the number of observations
when computing ĉjt. Column 2 of Table B offers the results from the estimation of
specification (33) for the restricted sample.
I augment specification (33) with additional terms and estimate the following
regression:











According to the theoretical model developed in the main text, the estimate of β1
is expected to be positive, while that of δ1 is expected to be negative. It can also
be expected that the estimate of β2 is negative so that the relationship between
competition and innovation in an industry has a shape resembling an inverted-U.
This is because, in this model, the relationship between competition and innovation
in an industry is increasing and concave, as long as there is a positive amount of
innovation. Moreover, increasing competition in an industry reduces profits in
equation (12) and there is a level of competition at which profits are equal to zero.
Innovation increases with competition till this level and ceases when the level of
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competition increases above this level. In the same vein, the estimate of δ2 can be
expected to be positive since resources that can be devoted to R&D decline with
competition in rival industries at a declining rate. This is because of the concave
relationship between competition and innovation in an industry. Moreover, they
increase in an industry if some of the rival industries stop innovating.
Table B: The Effects of Competition on Innovation
Dependent variable: citation-weighted
count of patents in industry j at time t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cjt 386.592*** 246.337*** 220.652**
(67.611) (93.873) (95.365)






Observations 354 286 286 286
Note: This table presents the results from the estimation of specification (35). Column 1 reports the results from
column 4 of Table 1 of Aghion et al. (2005). These results can be obtained estimating specification (35) for the
full sample of industries and parameter restriction δ1 = δ2 = 0. Column 2 reports the results when I drop SIC
industries 23, 35, 37 and 49 from the sample and keep δ1 = δ2 = 0. In columns 3 and 4, SIC industries 23, 35, 37
and 49 are dropped from the sample. Columns 3 and 4 report the results from the estimation of specification (35)
with and without parameter restriction β1 = β2 = 0, correspondingly. All regressions include industry and year
dummies and use the Poisson regression framework. Moreover, all regressions are carried out using the control
function method. To implement it, cjt and ĉjt are linearly projected on a set of exogenous instruments (see, for
the list of instruments Aghion et al., 2005). The residuals from these projections are added in specification (35)
as independent variables. The exogenous instruments are jointly significant in these projections and R-squares are
higher than 0.8. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the
5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Column 3 of Table B reports the results from the estimation of specification
(35) under the restriction β1 = β2 = 0. Column 4 of Table B reports the results
without this restriction. As expected, the estimate of δ1 is negative. which suggests
that innovation in an industry can decline with higher competition in other and
closely related industries. The estimates of β1, β2, and δ2 also have the expected
signs.
According to Column 4 of Table B, it is important to control for ĉ and ĉ2 in (35)
for the identification of the magnitude of estimates of β1 and β2. These estimates
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change by about 10 percent when ĉ and ĉ2 are controlled for.5
The results reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table B constitute a first attempt
to show that competition in an industry can affect innovation and growth in other
industries. They outline an area of potentially fruitful future research.
B.2 Calibration of the Chu (2011) and Goh and Olivier
(2002) Models
The model of this paper and the model developed by Chu (2011) feature two hor-
izontally related sectors, whereas the model developed by Goh and Olivier (2002)
features two vertically related sectors. Therefore, it is straightforward to calibrate
the model of Chu (2011) for the goods and services sectors as it is done in this pa-
per. I discuss the calibration and results for the model of Chu (2011) first because
of this. I change the notations of the models of Chu (2011) and Goh and Olivier
(2002) to align them more closely with the notation used in this paper.
Chu (2011) considers a two-sector version of the canonical Schumpeterian growth
model. In this model, equilibrium labor force allocations to production and R&D




























where σk is the share of expenditures on sector k out of expenditures on final
consumption goods, ρ is the discount rate, and ϕk is a technological opportunity
parameter. A higher value of ϕk increases the arrival rate of innovations. Concep-
tually, ϕk is similar to ξk and γk since increasing ϕk increases the sectoral growth
rate for a given amount of labor allocated to R&D. In turn, µk is the patent breadth
parameter. It characterizes the strength of property rights by establishing the min-
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imal difference between an idea and current patents such that the idea can be
patented. At the same time, it measures the market power of producers (patent
holders) because it defines their power to exclude certain ideas from being patented





The growth rates of sectors and final output are given by
gk = ϕkLrk ln z, (39)
gC = σ1g1 + (1− σ1)g2, (40)
where z is the exogenous step size of productivity improvement from an innovation.
I calibrate this model for the goods and services sectors. The values of L, ρ, σk,
and 1/ek are from Table 1. I set z to be equal to the base of the natural logarithm
so that ln z = 1 and derive the values of µk from equation (38). Finally, I calibrate
ϕk using the values of sectoral growth rates. Panel A of Table C offers the values
of µk and ϕk for k = 1, 2, where the goods sector is sector 1 and the services sector
is sector 2.
Table D reports the effects of a 10 percent increase in 1/ek in the goods and
services sectors on sectoral growth rates, as well as on the growth rate of final
output. As a policy, these comparative statics correspond to increasing patent
breadth and in that sense they correspond to strengthening property rights in the
goods and services sectors in the model of Chu (2011). Sectoral and aggregate
growth increase with patent breadth in this model.
These results differ from the results of the model of this paper in a few notable
ways. Changes in 1/ek have no cross-sectoral effects in the model of Chu (2011).
This is because 1/ek does not affect labor force allocation to sector k in the model of
Chu (2011). It affects labor force allocation across production and R&D activities
within sector k. This can be clearly seen by summing up Lxk and Lrk from equations
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Table C: The Values of Parameters of the Chu (2011) and Goh and Olivier (2002) Models
A. Chu (2011)
z 2.718
µ1 µ2 ϕ1 ϕ2
Germany 1.098 1.298 1.587 0.215
UK 1.136 1.163 1.729 0.306
US 1.159 1.287 1.231 0.162





χ 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700 0.800
Germany bi and bj 1.737 0.772 0.450 0.290 0.193 0.129 0.083
A 1.112 0.908 0.851 0.874 0.974 1.189 1.665
ε 5.000 3.333 2.500 2.000 1.667 1.429 1.250
UK bi and bj 1.372 0.610 0.356 0.229 0.152 0.102 0.065
A 1.267 1.039 0.976 1.005 1.122 1.371 1.920
ε 5.000 3.333 2.500 2.000 1.667 1.429 1.250
US bi and bj 2.088 0.928 0.541 0.348 0.232 0.155 0.099
A 0.737 0.614 0.587 0.614 0.696 0.863 1.227
ε 5.000 3.333 2.500 2.000 1.667 1.429 1.250
Note: Panel A in this table offers the calibrated values of parameters of the model of Chu (2011). The goods sector
is sector 1 and the services sector is sector 2. Panel B offers the calibrated values of parameters of the model of
Goh and Olivier (2002). See Table 1 for sample periods, the values of growth rates and the reminder of parameters.
15
Table D: The Growth Effects of Increasing Patent Breadth in the Chu (2011) Model
A: 10%∆ in 1/e1 B: 10%∆ in 1/e2 C: 10%∆ in 1/e1
and 1/e2
%∆ in g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC
Germany 16.920 0.000 7.197 0.000 21.338 12.262 16.920 21.338 19.459
UK 15.919 0.000 6.635 0.000 23.272 13.572 15.919 23.272 20.207
US 18.102 0.000 7.132 0.000 27.379 16.591 18.102 27.379 23.724
Note: This table offers the effects of increasing patent breadth (10% increase in 1/ek) on labor productivity growth
rates in the goods and services sectors (g1 and g2) and on the growth rate of the economy [gC = σ1g1 + (1− σ1) g2]
in Chu (2011) model. The effects are computed as percentage changes from the values of growth rates offered in
Table 1. The goods sector is sector 1 and the services sector is sector 2.
(36) and (37). Moreover, innovation in sector k increases with 1/ek in the model of
Chu (2011). Such an inference holds because innovation is carried out by entrants in
this model, and increasing 1/ek increases entrants’ post innovation profits and value.
In contrast, innovation declines with 1/ek in the model of the current paper. This
is because increasing 1/ek reduces competition, sales, and the marginal product of
innovation.6
Goh and Olivier (2002) consider a two-sector version of the Romer (1990) model,
where the sectors of the economy are vertically related. In this model, the growth
rate of final output is given by
gC = χgi, (41)
















) − ρ, (42)
χ is the share of labor compensation in the final goods sector, ε is the elasticity of
substitution between final goods, ρ is discount rate, and Ai and Aj are R&D pro-
ductivity parameters in the R&D labs of the intermediate and final goods sectors.7
These parameters are conceptually similar to ξk and γk. In turn, bi and bj are
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patent breadth parameters for the intermediate and final goods sectors. Similarly














To calibrate the values of the model parameters, I assume that mark-ups in
the intermediate and final goods sectors are equal and that initially there are no
differences between bi and bj: χbi/(1 − χ) = bj/(ε − 1) and bi = bj. I also assume
that Ai = Aj and denote e ≡ ei = ej.
I compute the price-cost margin at the economy-level, take its average over time
and use this average (1/e) to compute the values of χbi/(1−χ) and bj/(ε−1). The
share of labor compensation in the final goods sector χ is allowed to vary freely
in (0.2, 0.8) interval. For a given value of χ, the value of A is computed using the
value of gC from Table 1. Panel B of Table C offers the calibrated values of these
parameters.
Table E reports the effects of a 10 percent increase in bi and bj on the growth
rate of final output. As a policy, this corresponds to increasing the strength of
property rights in the intermediate and final goods sectors in the model of Goh and
Olivier (2002).
The growth rate of final output increases with the strength of patent breadth
in the intermediate goods sector and declines with the strength of patent breadth
in the final goods sector. The latter result holds because, similarly to the model of
the current paper, competition and property rights regulations have cross-sectoral
effects in the model of Goh and Olivier (2002). Within a sector, innovation increases
with b and mark-ups in the model of Goh and Olivier (2002).8 This is similar to
the model of Chu (2011) and in contrast to the model of the current paper. Again,
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Table E: The Growth Effects of Increasing Patent Breadth in the Goh and Olivier (2002)
Model
A: 10%∆ in bi B: 10%∆ in bj C: 10%∆ in bi and bj
%∆ in gC
Germany 12.962 -2.502 10.254
UK 11.435 -2.089 11.435
US 10.748 -3.327 10.748
Note: This table offers the effects of increasing patent breadth (10% increase in bi and bj) on the growth rate of
the economy in the Goh and Olivier (2002) model. The effects are computed as percentage changes from the value
of growth rate offered in Table 1 and are invariant to the value of χ.
such an inference holds because increasing b and mark-ups increases the entrants’
post innovation profits and value in the model of Goh and Olivier (2002).
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Notes
1This derivative is also negative (positive) if σ1 = 1/2, γ1 = γ2, ξ1 = ξ2, and α2,1 > α1,1 (α2,1 <
α1,1). Therefore, the strength of property rights can play an important role for the effect of
product market competition in an industry on economic growth.
2In the one-sector model developed by Chantrel, Grimaud, and Tournemaine (2012), resource
allocation and growth are socially optimal when licensors can verify the use of their patents and
have the bargaining power to exclude the use (i.e., α.,2 = 1). In the current model, this happens
only when e1 = e2.
3The authors have recently corrected that table and the corrections are available online.
4I use the 1984 input-output tables because the industry classification in this table directly matches
with the industry classification used by Aghion et al. (2005). Using a fixed year for shares should
not be a major issue because usually the shares of compensations change very little over time.
5It has to be noted that these changes are not statistically significant, even though they are
economically sizeable.
6The previous section of this appendix provides empirical evidence that competition can have
cross-sector effects. In turn, Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999) provide evidence that
innovation increases with competition. The model of this paper can also generate an inverted-U
shape like relationship between competition and innovation (Aghion et al., 2005).
7I consider the case when both the final and intermediate input sectors innovate.
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